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INTRODUCTION
There is a considerable and growing literature on the worldwide growth in judicial
power written primarily from a political-science perspective.' The central issues have
been, (1) why has judicial review spread around the globe, and (2) what are the
consequences for democracy? Regarding the first issue, the prevailing view among
political scientists is that the establishment of judicial review in new democracies
facilitates the trust needed among elites for democracy to work.2 The emphasis on the
role of elites ignores, however, the role ordinary citizens play in the emergence of courts
as powerful political actors. 3 Judicial review has become linked to the enforcement of
individual rights, 4 which suggests that the demand for rights by citizens is an important
factor in the emergence of constitutional courts as powerful political actors.5 It is a
mistake to ignore the role of societal actors as the emergence of new institutions is driven
by both demand and supply-side factors.6 With respect to the second issue, scholars are
deeply divided over the implications that the growth in judicial power has for democratic
governance. 7 Judicial optimists draw their lessons largely from new democracies to
argue that a collective decision to constitutionalize rights symbolizes a sharp break from
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; Visiting Professor and Director of the Constitutional
Law Center, Drake University School of Law, 2010-2011 academic year.
1. For a critical review of the literature, see Miguel Schor, Mapping Comparative Judicial Review, 7
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 257 (2008). Social scientists were among the first scholars to write about the
spread of judicial review. For a key early work, see The Global Expansion of Judicial Power (C. Neal Tate &
Torbjbm Vallinder eds., N.Y.U. Press 1995).
2. The seminal work is Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases (Cambridge U. Press 2003).
3. Schor, supra n. 1, at 267-270.
4. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Courts: A Primer for Decision Makers, 17 J. Democracy 125 (No.
3,2006).
5. Miguel Schor, An Essay on the Emergence of Constitutional Courts: The Cases of Mexico and
Colombia, 16 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 173, 183-194 (2009). For a seminal work on the role that interest groups
play in empowering courts, see Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution: Lawyers, Activists, and Supreme
Courts in Comparative Perspective (U. Chi. Press 1998).
6. Schor, supra n. 1, at 267-270.
7. Id. at 270-275.
789
1
Schor: New Thinking about National High Courts
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009
TULSA LA W RE VIEW
the past and facilitates the emergence of the citizen mores needed for democracy to
endure. Judicial pessimists, on the other hand, tend to draw their lessons from older,
well-established democracies to argue that the expansion of judicial power frustrates
democratic outcomes and debilitates the mores needed for democracy to work.9 The
pessimists have obviously lost the empirical battle as the spread of judicial review
continues unabated but they raise serious questions regarding the role of national high
courts10 in a democracy.
Two recent books - one by a law professor, the other by a political scientist - break
new ground on the work of national high courts and do so by relying on an internalist
rather than an externalist or social-science perspective. Victor Ferreres Comella, a law
professor at Pompeu Fabra University, argues in Constitutional Courts and Democratic
Values11 that specialized constitutional courts are better able to effectuate political
morality than is the U.S. Supreme Court. David Robertson, a political scientist at Oxford
University, argues in The Judge as Political Theoristl2 that national high courts play an
important role in spreading the values of a constitution throughout society. This essay
reviews these books and assesses their contribution to the burgeoning scholarship on
comparative judicial review.
ViCTOR FERRERES COMELLA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES: A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
The normative puzzle Professor Victor Ferreres explores begins with the
emergence of judicial review and robust bills of rights in Europe after the Second World
War. The post-war era witnessed the emergence of constitutional courts as powerful
political actors.13 The question is, why should Europe opt to entrust judicial review to
specialized constitutional courts? The centralized model of judicial review, after all,
departs radically from the American decentralized model of judicial review. The
conventional explanation for this divergence is historical. One of the key principles of
the French Revolution, which was subsequently embedded in civil codes that influenced
legal thinking throughout continental Europe, is that courts were precluded from
exercising judicial review by the principle of separation of powers. 14 Ferreres concludes
8. See Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe (U. Chi.
Press 2000); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va. L. Rev. 771 (1997); Mauro
Cappelletti, Repudiating Montesquieu? The Expansion and Legitimacy of "Constitutional Justice," 35 Cath. U.
L. Rev. 1 (1985).
9. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism
(Harvard U. Press 2004); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton U. Press
1999); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006).
10. This review essay uses the term "national high courts" to refer to all courts that have the power of
constitutional judicial review. The term "constitutional court" will be used to refer to centralized systems of
judicial review; the term "supreme court" will be used to refer to decentralized systems of judicial review. For
a discussion of the different institutional mechanisms used to effectuate judicial review, see Miguel Schor,
Judicial Review and American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 535 (2008).
11. Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (Yale
U. Press 2009) [hereinafter Ferreres].
12. David Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton U.
Press 2010).
13. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at 30-31.
14. Id. at 10-19. The European understanding of separation of powers is, of course, very different from the
790 [Vol. 45:789
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that historical and political explanations fail to adequately explain and justify the role of
constitutional courts. Ferreres emphasizes the role courts play in modern European
democracies construing bills of rights to argue that "constitutional courts are better
equipped than ordinary courts to treat the constitution as a special kind of law, one that is
deeply connected to abstract principles of political morality." 15
The key move in Ferreres's argument is the distinction he draws between
constitutional and ordinary courts. Constitutional courts are a better forum of principle
than are ordinary courts for two reasons. First, constitutional courts typically have a
diverse membership that facilitates a different discourse than does a court comprised
solely of legal specialists.16 Lawyers, professors, politicians, and high public officials are
all frequently appointed to constitutional courts. Politicians play an important role
because they can remind their fellow judges that the constitution must be "reinterpreted
in light of new circumstances." 17 The diversity of membership means that constitutional
courts are less likely to employ a "'legalistic"' discourse and more likely to grapple
directly with the "abstract principles of political morality" embedded in bills of rights. 18
Constitutional courts, for example, readily concede that rights may be restricted by
government and openly engage, therefore, in balancing.19 Constitutional courts are also
more likely to "resort to unwritten principles." 20 In short, constitutional courts "do not
shy away from the more abstract principles of political morality that are included in the
bill of rights." 2 1
Second, the institutional separation that constitutional courts enjoy from ordinary
courts plays a role in generating public deliberation over rights.22 Constitutional courts
have a monopoly on constitutional judicial review. Qualified political minorities may
bring a claim directly before a constitutional court without there being a concrete case or
controversy.23 These two features "help enhance the public visibility of constitutional
courts, as well as their impact on political debates." 24 Enabling the political community
to initiate claims sends a signal to the public that important issues are at stake and
reasonable disagreement exists over these issues. The possibility of bringing an
immediate claim also facilitates the discussion of constitutional issues in parliament
since the majority knows that the legislation will face a constitutional test.25 Abstract
review may also enable the constitutional court to better deal with the issues by
American understanding, which arguably requires, rather than precludes, courts from exercising judicial
review. See John Henry Merryman, The French Deviation, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 109 (1996).
15. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at xv.
16. Id. at 39-48.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Id. at 46.
19. Id. at 46-47.
20. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at 48.
21. Id. at 46.
22. Id. at 55-66.
23. Id. at 5-9, 55-69. In addition to constitutional challenges, constitutional issues may be referred by an
ordinary court to the constitutional court via a procedure known as a constitutional question. Id. at 5-9. Some
European polities also allow an ordinary citizen to allege that her rights have been violated via a constitutional
complaint. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at 5-9.
24. Id at 55.
25. Id. at 62-63.
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distancing them "from specific and fragmentary stories when they have to determine the
constitutionality of legislation." 26
Ferreres's defense of constitutional courts critiques two key assumptions of
American constitutional thought. The first is that the Constitution is a species of law. The
foundation for judicial review in the United States was first articulated in Marbury v.
Madison27 and rests on an analogy between the Constitution and statutes. Chief Justice
John Marshall reasoned that it is the business of courts to interpret all laws, including the
Constitution.28 The Supreme Court "cannot easily abandon a legalistic approach to
constitutional issues"29 because the "legitimacy of judicial review appears to be linked to
the assumption that the U.S. Constitution is part of the law that judges are experts at
interpreting and enforcing in concrete disputes."30 Consequently the charge that the
Court is being "activist" or not acting as a court of law is one that carries political weight
in the United States. Interpretive theories such as originalism, which have not proven
attractive in Europe, are attractive to American judges since they appear to preserve the
analogy between the Constitution and statutes. The U.S. Supreme Court, moreover, is
likely to focus on technical legal arguments at the expense of the moral issues to preserve
the appearance that it is acting as a court of law.
The second and related critique is the author's claim that constitutional courts
should embrace activism.3 1 Constitutional courts are specialized courts that were created
to undo authoritarian legacies by effectuating constitutions that are a "symbolic
expression of a deep collective commitment in favor of rights." 32 The objection that
overly powerful courts undermine democracy is met by examining the linkages between
political actors and courts. Legislatures can respond to constitutional decisions either by
amending the constitution or by enacting statutes that conflict with judicial doctrine to
generate a "second round of debate." 33 In addition, the ideological distance between the
elected branches and constitutional courts is likely to be smaller than, for example, can
occur in the United States because of different appointment mechanisms. Justices on
constitutional courts are typically appointed for a fixed term by super-majority
provisions. 34 Forcing competing factions to negotiate by means of a super-majority
appointment provision and lowering the stakes of each appointment by limiting the term
of office help ameliorate the political conflict that judicial review engenders. 35
Ferreres's argument that judicial activism is not a normative problem for
constitutional courts, however, is underdeveloped. One definition of judicial activism is
that judges should not impose their value preferences on democracy. Given that
26. Id at 69.
27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
28. Id at 177-178.
29. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at 52.
30. Id at 53.
31. Id. at 71-85.
32. Id. at 78. There is empirical evidence that constitutional courts tend to be more "activist" than
nonspecialized national high courts. See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries 224-228 (Yale U. Press 1999).
33. Ferreres, supra n. I1, at 96.
34. Id at 98-100.
35. See Schor, supra n. 10.
[Vol, 45:789792
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constitutional courts openly debate the moral issues raised in constitutional disputes, it
would appear that activism might be an issue for constitutional courts as well. It would
have been helpful for the author to have discussed some of the leading cases and the
political conflicts they engendered to substantiate his point that activism is simply not an
issue in European democracies. The failure to discuss constitutional cases is problematic
given that the thesis of Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values is that
constitutional courts forthrightly discuss issues of political morality.
DAVID ROBERTSON, THE JUDGE AS POLITICAL THEORIST: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
David Robertson's The Judge as Political Theorist examines in detail the case law
produced by national high courts around the world and takes, therefore, a very different
approach than does Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values. Robertson's
theoretical concerns are driven by his empirical approach. The Judge as Political
Theorist analyzes the output of national high courts to "understand the core nature of the
business of doing judicial review" and "how such activity fits into modem liberal
democracy."36 The argument is that the job of national high courts is to spread the values
of a constitution throughout society: "[C]onstitutional judges often come near to being
applied political theorists, carrying out a quite new type of political function." 37 In
fulfilling this mandate, judges create and rely on a body of judicial material, "part of
what the French Conseil constitutionnel calls the bloc de constitutionnalitd."38 In short,
the right way to understand what it is that national high courts do is to examine and take
seriously the common law of the constitution.
The Judge as Political Theorist is built around five case studies: Germany, Eastern
Europe, France, Canada, and South Africa. These cases were chosen because they
represent examples of where judicial review was added to "societies that have undergone
major change" 39 and consequently the "constitution emerges as a symbolic marker of a
great transition in the political life of a nation."40 Constitutional transitions are important
because they invite courts to take on new tasks.41 Robertson critiques the political-
science paradigm that focuses on why courts emerge as political actors and largely
ignores what they actually do.42 The author utilizes an internalist perspective that takes
judges and judicial arguments seriously. Ideology matters, but it is an ideology formed in
the crucible of legal training.43 Judges are tasked with the job of turning constitutions
into action. Constitutions are not a cohesive political program but "bullet points" and
36. Robertson, supra n. 12, at x.
37. Id. at 1.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ackerman, supra n. 8, at 778).
41. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 6-7. Scholars have largely ignored how courts are transformed when they
begin to exercise judicial review. But see Schor, supra n. 5, at 192 ("When courts assume the job of judicial
review in a new democracy, they may become institutions whose members believe they have an important role
to play in keeping the democratic enterprise afloat.").
42. Id. at 13-19.
43. For a decisive and seminal monograph on this point, see E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The
Origin of the Black Act (Pantheon Bks. 1975).
7932011]1
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"judges are required to weave the bullet points into a coherent and cohesive ideology for
their contemporary world." 44
The case studies offer a rich description of the job of national high courts and
nicely illustrate the themes of the book. The first and most important case study is
Germany. The German Basic Law declares the rupture with the totalitarian past in its
first article that provides that human dignity shall remain inviolate.45 The German Basic
Law was a "deliberate moral act on the part of the German people." 46 The extent of this
rupture with this past is illustrated by the Federal Constitutional Court's seminal decision
in Liith.4 7 The issue was whether the Basic Law had horizontal effects. The Federal
Constitutional Court reasoned that rights had two aspects, one subjective, the other
objective. The subjective side was that rights existed to protect individuals. The objective
side was that they represented values that the society was committed to effectuating.48
The Federal Constitutional Court imposed on itself a "duty to ensure that the objective
values of the constitution 'radiate' throughout . . . society" 49 and that rights, therefore,
had "horizontal" effects that reached the actions of private individuals.
France is a critical case because the French Constitutional Council was designed to
be an umpire in separation of power disputes between the president and Parliament. 50
The 1958 Constitution lacks a bill of rights, but its preamble states that the French people
are committed to the "Rights of Man" declared in 1789 and the Preamble of the 1946
Constitution.51 The French Constitutional Council, therefore, lacked the power to make
major legal statements by construing a bill of rights. The seminal case that transformed
the role of the Council is the 1971 Associations Law decision.52 The French
Constitutional Council relied on the bloc de constitutionnalite, the "bits and pieces of
doctrine and sources that make up the Conseil's constitutional review armoury," 53 to
implicate rights that could be used to invalidate legislation. The case is often called
France's Marbury as it transformed the French Constitutional Council from the
watchdog of the boundary between Parliament and the president into a font of
constitutional values.
Canada adopted a bill of rights known as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
44. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 32.
45. Grundgesetz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] (Constitution) art. 1(1) (Ger.)
46. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 53.
47. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/-
worknew/german/case.php?id= 1369). Liith is a seminal case in the development of global constitutionalism.
See Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative
Constitutional Law 196-197 (Princeton U. Press 2007); Jacco Bomhoff, Liith's 50th Anniversary: Some
Comparative Observations on the German Foundations ofJudicial Balancing, 9 German L.J. 121 (2008).
48. 7 BVerfGE 198 (1958) (available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/-
worknew/german/case.php?id=1369).
49. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 52. The U.S. Supreme Court has largely rejected the idea that the actions of
private actors must comply with the Constitution under what is known as the state-action doctrine. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). For a comparative study of the state action doctrine, see Tushnet, supra n. 47, at 162-
225.
50. John Bell, French Constitutional Law 14-54 (Oxford U. Press 1992).
51. La Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958 preamble (Fr.). See also Robertson, supra n. 12, at 146.
52. No. 71-41 DC, 16 July 1971.
53. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 149.
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1982.54 The Charter, like the German Basic Law, marks a sharp break from the past,
albeit one adopted in less dramatic circumstances. Prior to the adoption of the Charter in
1982, the principle of judicial deference to Parliament was strongly entrenched. As a
consequence, "[t]he Supreme Court was from the beginning intensely conscious of the
need to carve out a new and much more active role, and correspondingly aware how vital
its first few decisions would be."55 One of the key early cases is R. v Oakes.56 The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms begins with a general limitations clause in
section one that forthrightly states that rights are not absolute but "subject only to such
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." 57 Oakes gave a definitive interpretation of section one. The case is
highly influential because balancing tests lie at the heart of what modem national high
courts do and have generated, therefore, a large and important comparative
constitutional law literature. 59
In the last chapter, the author restates and defends his premise that "constitutional
review is like writing political theory."60 National high courts have become a fourth
branch of government that articulates values: "Judges engaged in constitutional review
act like political theorists, developing and explicating the value choices made, sometimes
unconsciously, when the relevant constituent body set up the constitution." 61 Robertson
observes that modem bills of rights differ from the U.S. Bill of Rights, which is the
"grandfather constitution whose politics have so influenced all our thinking."62 Modem
constitutions empower judges to develop values for an evolving society as "most modem
constitutions make no pretence that their bill of rights sections contain absolutes."63 The
notion that constitutions have a purpose and that the job of constitutional judges is to
develop the values contained therein entails a rejection of originalism.64
CONCLUSIONS
The two books reviewed use different approaches to comparatively examine
national high courts. Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values is a work in
54. Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People? (3d ed., U.
Toronto Press 2004).
55. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 193.
56. R. v Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. See also Robertson, supra n. 12, at 200 (noting that Oakes is
"probably the most important single case in the history of the Charter.").
57. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 (U.K.), being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
58. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 281-346.
59. Two recent, important articles are Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and Reality ofAmerican Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 391 (2008), and David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 Minn. L.
Rev. 652 (2005). An empirical analysis of why balancing tests emerged around the world in the twentieth
century can be found in Schor, supra n. 5, at 189-191.
60. Robertson, supra n. 12, at 347.
61. Id. at 348.
62. Id. at 356.
63. Id. Comparatively speaking, the U.S. Supreme Court is unusual in its rejection of values and its
concomitant emphasis on originalism. See Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the
Constitutional Imagination, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1463, 1486-1494 (2009).
64. See generally Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in The
Migration of Constitutional Ideas 84 (Sujit Choudhry ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006).
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normative theory that posits that centralized systems of judicial review do a better job of
effectuating constitutions than do decentralized systems. It is the most important piece of
scholarship in English on constitutional courts. The author displays a fine knowledge of
European constitutional courts as well as American constitutional theory. The Judge as a
Political Theorist, on the other hand, is deeply empirical. It posits that, if we wish to
understand what national high courts do, we need to examine the constitutional common
law they create. The Judge as Political Theorist is a rare and important work because of
its single-minded focus on the "common law" of the constitution. 65
Both books should be of interest to political scientists, law professors, and
comparative constitutionalists. The two studies forthrightly question the dominant
political-science paradigm that assumes that the raison d'dtre for constitutional courts is
to enforce separation of powers. They both look to bills of rights rather than separation
of powers in seeking to understand the business of national high courts.66 Legal scholars
will find the rejection of originalism by courts abroad of interest. Quite simply, any
argument that originalism flows solely from the nature of a written constitution is
empirically infirm. Constitutions, after all, are as much political programs pointing to the
future as they are limits to power. The wealth of detail found in both books will be of
interest to comparative constitutionalists who will find the two studies fecund sources of
new thinking about national high courts.
65. Comparative constitutional law casebooks for obvious reasons take seriously the output of national high
courts. See e.g. Norman Dorsen, Michel Rosenfeld, Andrds Saj6 & Susanne Baer, Comparative
Constitutionalism. Cases and Materials (Thomson-West 2003); Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet,
Comparative Constitutional Law 1-140 (2d ed., Found. Press 2006). Comparative constitutional scholarship, on
the other hand, has largely eschewed the hard work of analyzing the dizzying output of national high courts
around the world to focus on big questions such as the spread of judicial review and its the implications for
democracy as well as whether constitutional systems are diverging or converging. See Schor, supra n. 1.
66. Ferreres, supra n. 11, at 10-19; Robertson, supra n. 12, at 1.
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